

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 285072

BELGRADE FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, NATO

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SUBJECT: CSCE/CBMS: RESPONSE TO ROMANIAN INITIATIVE

REFS: (A) BELGRADE 7613 (B) BELGRADE 7307
(C) BELGRADE 7658 (D) STATE 271723 (E) BELGRADE 7975
(F)USNATO 11387

1. THE FOLLOWING PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR RESPONDING

TO THE ROMANIAN CBMS INITIATIVES ANALYZED BY THE DELEGATION IN REFTTEL A. THIS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GENERAL CBMS INSTRUCTION PROVIDED IN REFTTEL D.

2. WE BELIEVE ALLIES CAN COUNTER THE ROMANIAN CBMS PROPOSAL EFFECTIVELY BY ADDRESSING IT IN A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE FASHION, POINTING OUT THAT THE NOW TABLED ALLIED PACKAGE OF CBMS PROPOSALS INCLUDING A COMPREHENSIVE MOVEMENTS INITIATIVE IS EVIDENCE OF OUR CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT, CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THESE ISSUES. THE DIFFICULTIES BELOW WHICH PREVENT US FROM ACCEPTING A MANDATORY OBLIGATION TO NOTIFY AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS MAY, WE BELIEVE, BE USEFULLY EXPOUNDED

IN WORKING GROUP DISCUSSION.

3. FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON CERTAIN POINTS RAISED.

A. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE INCLUSION IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF A FAVORABLE REFERENCE TO THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) AND AGREE WITH OBSERVATIONS IN PARAS 4A AND 4B OF REFTTEL A.

B. WE AGREE THAT MUCH OF THE LANGUAGE IN THE FIRST SECTION OF TEXT IN REF B IS EXCESSIVE. IN ATTEMPTING
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TO TONE THIS PORTION DOWN YOU MIGHT POINT OUT THAT IT ADDRESSES VERY COMPLEX ISSUES WHICH ARE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE, AND WHILE ALL NATIONS WOULD LIKE TO SEE RAPID ACCOMPLISHMENTS, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO DETRACT FROM PROGRESS THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE.

C. WE CONCUR WITH THE DELEGATION'S COMMENTS ON THE ROMANIAN PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE IN SECTION II OF REF B AND AGREE THAT THE ALLIES MAY WANT TO TABLE THEIR OWN TEXT.

D. MOVEMENTS

OUR PRINCIPAL PROBLEM WITH THE ROMANIAN MOVEMENTS PROPOSAL IS ITS AMBIGUITY. WE AGREE THE US SHOULD USE THE ALLIES MOVEMENTS PROPOSAL AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS, STRESSING THE ADVANTAGES IN ITS SPECIFICITY. THE ROMANIAN PROPOSAL ITSELF SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ALONG THE SAME LINES SUGGESTED IN SEPTTEL GUIDANCE ON THE NNA INITIATIVES. ONCE CSCE HAS ACCUMULATED A BODY OF EXPERIENCE IN IMPLEMENTING THE MOVEMENTS CBM ENVISIONED BY THE

ALLIES, WE CAN ASSESS THE PROS AND CONS OF A MORE
AMBITIOUS GROUND FORCE MOVEMENTS CBM.

E. MULTINATIONAL MANEUVERS NEAR THE BORDERS

THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY BE CITED BY THE DELEGATION:

-- TO DENY NATO THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT MANEUVERS
NEAR NATIONAL FRONTIERS WOULD LIMIT THE ABILITY
OF THIS DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE TO EXERCISE ITS ARMED
FORCES IN PRECISELY THOSE AREAS WHERE DEFENSE WOULD BE
NEEDED, I.E., OVER THE APPROACH ROUTES TO THE
INTERIOR OF THE ALLIANCE STATES.

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-- THE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE IN C-M(77)61, PAGE 15
IS ALSO PERTINENT. AS THE IMS POINTS OUT, EARLIER
YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL ON "AVOIDANCE OF HOLDING" BORDER
MANEUVERS WAS RECEIVED WITH LITTLE ENTHUSIASM IN
1974. ALLIES AT THAT TIME REGARDED IT AS UNACCEPTABLE
EVEN AS A BASIS FOR NOTIFYING MANEUVERS, BECAUSE
IT COULD INTRODUCE AN UNDESIRABLE REGIONAL ELEMENT
INTO CSCE. MOREOVER, CERTAIN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
ALREADY EXIST GOVERNING THE HOLDING OF MANEUVERS
IN BORDER AREAS. ONE ALLY (ITALY) DEPLOYS MOST
OF ITS GROUND FORCES, IN AREAS ADJACENT TO BORDER
AREAS; ALL ALLIES REGULARLY EXERCISE ALONG BORDERS.

-- IT MAY OF COURSE BE THAT THE ROMANIANS EXPECT
THEIR PROPOSAL TO BE MODIFIED TO REQUIRE ONLY
NOTIFICATIONS OF BORDER MANEUVERS; THIS MAY HAVE
TO BE ADDRESSED LATER.

E. AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS

WE GENERALLY ENDORSE YOUR ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE
ROMANIAN CALL FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND
NAVAL MANEUVERS AND FOR RESTRICTIONS ON CERTAIN
KINDS OF MILITARY ACTIVITY. IT IS PROBABLE THAT
THE ROMANIANS DO NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE ADDRESSED
SERIOUSLY AT BELGRADE. THEY MAY HAVE ADVANCED THEM
TO GIVE MORE VIABILITY TO THEIR MOVEMENTS INITIATIVE
AND THEIR AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS INITIATIVE.
DELEGATION SHOULD USE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
AS REQUIRED.

-- THE ROMANIAN PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE NOTIFICATION
OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE
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ALLIANCE. GREAT DIFFICULTY LIES IN THE DEFINITIONAL SENSE--WHAT IS AN AIR OR NAVAL MANEUVER AND WHERE DO "ADJACENT WATERS AND AIRSPACE" BEGIN AND END? FOR EXAMPLE, SIXTH FLEET SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT ARE ALMOST CONSTANTLY AT SEA OR AIRBORNE; "MANEUVERING" IS A ROUTINE ASPECT OF THEIR DAILY OPERATIONS. SIMILAR AIR/NAVAL MANEUVERING TAKES PLACE IN OTHER WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO EUROPE, I.E., NORTH SEA, NORTH ATLANTIC. WE HAVE NOT YET FOUND A FASHION IN WHICH AIR AND SEA MANEUVERS OR MOVEMENTS CAN BE USEFULLY DEFINED FOR CSCE/CBM PURPOSES. ACCORDINGLY, WE SEE NO MERIT TO JOINING AN EFFORT TO DISCOVER SUCH DEFINITIONS.

-- FURTHERMORE, WITH REGARD TO SEA MANEUVERS OR MOVEMENTS, IT IS ESTABLISHED US AND ALLIED POLICY IN LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS TO PRESERVE FREEDOM TO CONDUCT ACTIVITIES ON THE HIGH SEAS, INCLUDING AIR SPACE ABOVE, WITHOUT ANY EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT OBLIGATION FOR GIVING NOTIFICATION OR RECEIVING PERMISSION (AS WELL AS UNIMPEDED TRANSIT THROUGH OR OVER STRAITS USED FOR INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION, WITH WHICH EUROPEAN "ADJOINING WATERS" ABOUND).

-- MOREOVER, THE ROMANIAN PROPOSAL WOULD ADVERSELY IMPACT ON OUR EFFORTS TO AVOID SIMILAR RESTRICTIONS IN OTHER REGIONS WHICH WOULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF THOSE "TERRITORIALIST" STATES WHO IN LOS NEGOTIATIONS SEEK TO EXTEND NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER HIGH SEAS FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OVERFLIGHT WITHIN THE 200-MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE.

-- ALSO, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH THE DEFINITIONAL PROBLEM OUTLINED ABOVE, TO ACCEPT A REQUIREMENT TO

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PRE-NOTIFY AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS/MOVEMENTS COULD IMPACT ADVERSELY ON U.S. FORCE READINESS, IN THAT OUR NAVY (LIKE ALL OTHERS) ROUTINELY CONDUCTS UNSCHEDULED TRAINING EXERCISES ALL THE TIME ITS VESSELS ARE AT SEA. THESE OFTEN ARE DIRECTED AGAINST "TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY" (UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT AND/OR NAVAL VESSELS,

FOR EXAMPLE). SUCH EXERCISE WOULD BE PROHIBITED IF BLANKET PRE-NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT WERE ACCEPTED. ALTERNATIVELY, PRE-NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS THAT WOULD PERMIT SUCH EXCEPTIONS WOULD LOSE MUCH OF THEIR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IMPACT. THEREFORE, WE ARE NOT ATTRACTED TO THIS PROVISION.

-- HOWEVER, OUR DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BOTH IN BRUSSELS AND IN BELGRADE SHOULD CERTAINLY POINT OUT THAT ALLIES HAVE IN THE PAST ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION OF SEVERAL GROUND MANEUVERS THOSE AIR AND NAVAL ELEMENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE GROUND MANEUVERS WHEN SUCH INFORMATION WAS IMPORTANT TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE NOTIFIED MANEUVER AS A WHOLE. (THIS WAS DONE IN NOTIFYING TEAMWORK 76, CARBON EDGE, AND STANDHAFTE CHATTEN).

-- WE ARE PREPARED, ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, TO CONTINUE INCLUDING SUCH INFORMATION IN OUR GROUND MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS. IF ALLIES SHOULD SUGGEST AN OBLIGATION TO INCLUDE INFORMATION ON AIR AND NAVAL ELEMENTS IN GROUND MANEUVER NOTIFICATIONS, WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THEIR RATIONALE FOR THIS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE CONFIDENTIAL

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IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DEFINE THE CONTENT OF SUCH AN ADDITIONAL NOTIFICATION OBLIGATION EXCEPT IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS, WHICH IN TURN MIGHT ENGENDER MORE UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION THAN CONFIDENCE.

4. DISARMAMENT

IN ADDITION TO THE ARGUMENTATION YOU SUGGEST IN PARA 4(C) REF A, ALLIES SHOULD DRAW ON DISCUSSIONS IN ANNEXES V AND VI TO C-M(77)61. PRESIDENT CARTER'S REMARKS, CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BEFORE UNGA ARE ALSO DIRECTLY RELEVANT.

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